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Country Profiles - Congo (Brazzaville)

Political, social and economic framework

THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO is often referred to as Congo (Brazzaville) in order to avoid confusion with neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire (see page 32). The country has a small stretch of coast on the Atlantic Ocean between Gabon and Angola; its inland borders are with Cameroon to the north, the Central African Republic to the north-east and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the south-east. The country has a total area of 342,000 square kilometres, 60% of which is covered by rainforests.1 Over half the 2.7 million inhabitants of Congo (Brazzaville) live in the cities in the south of the country.2 GNP per capita in 1997 was US$ 660 and life expectancy was 51 years.3 Most of the rainforests are in the scarcely-populated and remote north of the country (which represents 57% of Congo’s territory but has just 230,500 inhabitants).4 For much of the rural population here, the forest and its resources are their main source of livelihood.

Congo (Brazzaville) gained independence from France in 1960; it has had a turbulent history both before and after independence. Between 1958 and 1979, there were three presidential coups and one presidential assassination. Military rule was established in 1968. Colonel Denis Sassou Nguesso assumed power in 1979 and ruled as a dictator until 1992, when President Lissouba was elected. Since then, violence and civil war have erupted periodically between various government and militia forces loyal either to Lissouba, Sassou Nguesso or a former prime minister, Kolelas. During a savage five-month civil war in 1997, thousands of unarmed civilians were killed and 700,000 displaced (over one-quarter of the population), as they fled into the countryside or to neighbouring countries. Grave human rights abuses against the civilian population were perpetrated by all sides in the conflict. Sassou Nguesso seized power again in October 1997. A new civil war broke out at the end of 1998. Despite two ceasefires signed in 1999, violence continued at the end of 1999. Internally displaced people returning to their homes in 1999 faced serious human rights abuses, including killings, disappearances, and rape.5 A fragile peace was restored in 2000.

Congo (Brazzaville) faces the enormous task of restoring the population’s hope in the future following the traumatic events that people have endured in recent years, as well as physically rebuilding the country. Demobilising and disarming former militia members, many of whom were responsible for human rights abuses, is critical to ensuring a lasting peace, and includes the daunting challenge of reconciliation. Establishing a government based on democratic and inclusive principles will be essential for laying the foundations for sustainable development that benefits all of the people. As a start, presidential, legislative and local elections are scheduled for 2001.

As well as the political challenges ahead, the country also faces the escalating monetary costs of resettling displaced persons and rebuilding infrastructure and institutions. For example, the railway from Brazzaville to the port of Pointe Noire is of immense importance to the country’s economy and was a strategic target during the civil war, suffering damage which resulted in the line’s closure for a considerable period. It is likely to be some time before it is fully operational again.

Although Congo (Brazzaville) was the fourth largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa in 1999,6 the country remains highly indebted to international financial institutions and debt arrears continue to escalate. At the end of 1999, its total external debt amounted to CFA Fr 3,357 billion (US$ 4.36 billion), equivalent to 246% of its GDP, with arrears of CFA Fr 1,279 billion (US$ 1.66 billion).7 The country does not as yet qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative, although international donors met in October 2000 to discuss the situation. They indicated that, if the country follows stringent macro-economic policies, including privatisation, developing the non-oil sectors and fiscal management, as well as commencing work on a Poverty Reduction Strategy, this would take the country one step nearer to qualification for debt relief (see page 9 for more on HIPC).8 As part of structural adjustment policies, multilateral creditors are encouraging the development of the non-oil sectors of the economy, including forestry, and the privatisation of state-controlled institutions, including former forest parastatals. Timber exports represent the country’s second major source of export revenues after oil and the forestry sector provides 10% of formal employment.9 Forestry’s contribution to GNP increased from 1% in 1982 to 5% in 1996.10

Forest policy and practice



Because of disruptions to the railway as a result of the civil wars, logs from northern Congo have been leaving the country on this road via Cameroon (photo, right).

Of the 21.5 million hectares of the country’s forests, approximately half of them (12.7 million hectares) are classified as productive forest suitable for timber exploitation.11 The rest are flooded or semi-flooded forests or are located in irregular terrain not amenable to commercial exploitation.12 In 1995, 37% of the total forest area of Congo was held in concessions and this has increased rapidly since 1996.

There are two main areas of commercially exploitable natural forests in Congo:13

§ In the south, in the regions of Kouilou-Mayombe and Chaillu-Niari, forests cover 4.5 million hectares of which just over 4 million hectares were held as concessions in 1995.14 Forests in these regions are relatively accessible and have been intensively exploited since the 1940s.15 In 1990, over 50% of the country’s total production came from here.16 The two main tree species targeted are Okoumé and Limba. Logging operations in the south virtually ceased because of the civil war;

§ In the north, forests cover 17.3 million hectares,17 of which 8.9 million are deemed exploitable.18 Prior to 1996, concessions had been allocated for 2.1 million hectares of northern forests and forestry activities were limited because of the relative isolation of the region; this has been changing rapidly. In 1996 alone, 3.2 million hectares were allocated for timber exploitation19 and, since 1998, President Sassou Nguesso has been actively seeking multinational logging companies to take over the exploitation of the remaining unallocated forests in the north of the country. Many of the previously unallocated concessions have now been allocated and former parastatals have been privatised. As a result, the northern forests are becoming increasingly significant for timber production. The two main tree species targeted are Sapelli and Sipo.

The state department responsible for the forestry sector is the Ministry of Forest Economy (Ministère de l’Economie Forestière). The forestry industry was until recently legally governed by the 1974 Forestry Code. Its revision by Parliament began in 1993, which produced a draft revised version in June 1998 (see below). The 1974 law specified that the forest be divided into management units (unités d’aménagement), each of which must have a precise plan of management and exploitation.20 Stipulations regarding harvesting and development practices were set out, as well as how much concessionaires could produce per year (VMA — volume maximum annuel). Of the 27 management units that existed in 1990, only five had a management plan but none observed it.21 In northern Congo none of the active forestry units have a management plan, although some companies are now developing them.

The June 1998 version of the Forestry Code includes the following objectives:22

§ Sustainable management of forests;

§ Conservation of biological diversity;

§ Reforestation, mainly through communal and industrial plantations;

§ Decentralisation of the sector and international co-operation;

§ Development and diversification of industries based on the local transformation of almost all log production. To attain this objective, the new code establishes that, whereas the maximum period of production concession is for 10 years, permits for the processing industry can last up to 15 years and can be renewed.

In January1998, President Sassou Nguesso announced that logging companies were forbidden to export logs23 and that all companies had to present a plan for timber processing.24 In March 2000, however, the Congolese government finally approved the law, and it stated that 60% of timber production must be processed locally.25 Although the increased emphasis on downstream processing should bring additional revenues to the government, the implementation of this policy will not be immediate given that processing facilities have been little developed in the country to date; in 1997, the country had 30 processing units but only five had export capacity. Most exports are still of logs.

The government often lacks the capacity to develop social infrastructure, particularly in the north. As a result, social development projects are often specified as part of the contract between government and forestry companies and are known as the cahier des charges. Projects include the construction of roads, schools and clinics. In some instances, these projects are undertaken in lieu of taxes or by the company under contract to the government, and are therefore at the government’s, and not the company’s, expense.

Congo (Brazzaville)’s forestry taxes are considered to be low and substantial revenues have been lost because of irregularities; the government itself estimates that US$ 4 billion in timber industry levies have been foregone as a result.26 Logging companies still have considerable room for negotiation about timber volumes and taxes. This has facilitated corruption in the awarding and exploitation of generous concessions.27 Tax incentives are favouring the development of forestry operations in the north of the country. In 1999, one French company, Rougier, was granted a 370,000 hectare concession near the border with the Central African Republic (CAR), reportedly on terms so generous that it could expect to recover its capital investment in just two years and would pay just one-third of the normal royalties to the government.28

The costs of the war are being felt by forestry companies in a number of ways: the disruption to transport routes, especially the railway, have added considerably to transport costs from the north; the cessation of operations in the south of the country; the kidnapping of staff (see Wonnemann, page 66); forestry companies are now being asked by the government to employ former militia members to help reintegrate them into society, even though they are unqualified.29

Because of disruptions to the railway as a result of the civil wars, logs from northern Congo have been leaving the country by road via Cameroon to Douala rather than being floated down river to the main river port in Brazzaville, where authorities control and tax timber traffic, and then on by rail to Pointe Noire.30 Even prior to the war, the river and rail option entailed lost revenues to the government; the long journey down river enabling many logs to be stolen and informally processed before they reached Brazzaville itself. It is not always clear what happens to the money that is paid by logging companies in taxes. According to some reports, part of the US$ 4 million paid by one new company for its concessions paid the rebels to come back while another part simply "evaporated".31

Monitoring and enforcement capacity of the Ministry is weak. As with most government departments, they are virtually non-existent in the north of the country. Civil servants go for long periods of time without pay, which not only seriously demotivates staff but also means that they must look for alternative sources of income. This situation facilitates corruption and informal "taxation", for example on commercial bushmeat.32

Production and EU trade

In the second half of the 1980s, timber production grew consistently, attaining a total of 883,000 cubic metres in 1990. But during the first half of the 1990s, timber production in Congo decreased, in contrast to the rest of the region — in 1995, production had dropped by half to 441,000 cubic metres.33 In 1996, production went up to 560,000 cubic metres but in the following year declined to its lowest level in the last 30 years, 300,000 cubic metres, because of the civil war.34 Since then, however, log production has begun to rise again: 550,000 cubic metres in 199835 and an estimated 800,000 cubic metres in 1999.36 The government plans even further expansion of the industrial forestry sector, aiming to more than double timber production in the year 2000 up to 2 million cubic metres.37

Most timber exports are of logs rather than processed products. In 1997, total log exports from Congo were 257,449 cubic metres; sawn wood exports were 37,930 cubic metres; veneer exports were 41,666 cubic metres and plywood was 2,613 cubic metres.38 In 1999, log exports were 203,544 cubic metres; sawn wood exports were 61,861 cubic metres; veneer exports were 16,540 cubic metres and plywood was zero.39 In the early 1990s, exports of pulpwood from plantations were significant — 670,000 cubic metres in 1990 — but have since declined because the plantations are depleted.40 Since 1984, the Sapelli and Okoumé tree species represent 60-65% of total exports. Ayous, Bahia and Sipo are the next three most targeted commercial species.41

The European Union continues to be the primary destination for timber exports from Congo, with France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain being the main importers. Outside the EU, the main importer is Japan. In addition, it is believed that considerable volumes of logs are being smuggled out of the north of the country from some of the newly allocated concessions.

International financial assistance

As in the other countries in Central Africa (apart from the DRC), Congo (Brazzaville) receives support from the EU forest conservation and sustainable development programme, ECOFAC, which has a project in the 280,000 hectare National Park of Odzala in the north-west of the country. Odzala has an exceptional variety of different landscapes and is home to a number of forest and savannah animal species such as chimpanzees and elephants. ECOFAC is developing the sustainable management of the park, including the promotion of sustainable economic activities in the park’s surroundings, such as eco-tourism, to provide an alternative to bushmeat hunting.42

Logging companies appear to have received funds from multilateral organisations, although the connections are not always clear. In 1990, for example, the African Development Bank granted a loan to a French company, J. Lalanne, which only three years before had gained a contract to run a recently-established semi-state company,43 Société Forestière Algéro-Congolaise.44 In 1994, the French national development agency, Agence Française du Dévéloppement (AFD) — or CFD (Caisse Française du Développement) as it then was — was involved in the negotiations for a substantial equity stake that J. Lalanne had in another logging company, SNBS (Société Nouvelle des Bois de Sangha).

The World Bank’s investment in Congo (Brazzaville) has been controversial. In the 1990s, for example, together with a number of African banks, it financed the construction by another logging company, SCBO, of a sawmill that was never completed.45 SCBO was a semi-state company, partly owned by French interests,46 one of whose directors was Congo’s President.47 The company has recently been privatised and is now owned by the German company Danzer (see Part III — Company Profiles).48

Environmental impacts

The forests of the south and north have exhibited different levels and intensity of environmental impacts as a result of forestry operations. In the south, where industrial logging has been taking place since the 1940s, forests have been opened up by forestry companies, attracting migrant farmers who further clear the forest for agriculture.49 In the north, the area of logging concessions is rapidly increasing and, given the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement of these remote forests, the ecological sustainability of forestry operations is not ensured.50 Exploitation of the forests has facilitated commercial bushmeat hunting, which is decimating wildlife in a number of areas. The loss of biodiversity which results from logging has long-term consequences both ecologically and socially.

Although the country has protected areas, the capacity to monitor them is minimal. In the National Park of Counkouati, which is on the Atlantic coast near the country’s border with Gabon, the government has granted logging concessions of 9,000 hectares in the 500,000 hectare reserve, which was set up with grants from the EU, the World Bank and several environmental organisations.51 The lack of monitoring in the park — there are just 22 ill-equipped rangers for the entire park — has also enabled poachers to operate freely in the reserve — they have set up a vast encampment within it. The park suffers, moreover, from offshore oil pollution.52

Social impacts

The presence of forestry companies in the north of the country has positive and negative impacts. Many of the companies act as a surrogate for the state, creating islands of stability in otherwise neglected areas of the country. Nevertheless, their practices have critical shortcomings, such as discrimination against local people in general and against Pygmies in particular, and promotion of commercial bushmeat hunting. Forestry companies generally only recognise the rights of and enter into communication with Bantu villagers, neglecting the Pygmy forest dwellers. Bantu communities therefore tend to get most of the benefits from the operations, such as cash and goods, schools and dispensaries. Roads tend to go through their villages. Despite some positive developments, however, logging operations have negative impacts to a greater or lesser degree on all local people. From local people’s perspectives, the main problems are:

The companies do not listen sufficiently to local people’s needs.

Although villagers generally support logging companies, there tends to be profound disagreements over specific issues. Local Congolese may want a school to be built if the company logs their area, or they may not want large Sapelli trees near the village to be felled as they provide large quantities of caterpillars that are eaten when there is little other food available (see Sapelli Tree feature, page 7). But unless villagers take direct action, such as blocking the loggers’ roads with barricades, their needs are rarely listened to or respected.53


Mbendjele women and children, Sangha region

Companies tend not to provide employment for the local people.

The local population strongly resent the logging companies employing so many people from outside the forest areas they are exploiting. The ‘Front National de la Sangha’ was the main vehicle for expressing this discontent in the mid to late 1990s when violent demonstrations took place. Although now somewhat suppressed, the Front still has large popular support. The Front wished to impose a quota system for employing local people, but since a whole generation of northern Congolese has not had access to an adequate education, they do not possess the skills required by the logging companies.54

Traditional rights are violated.

In some areas, "eco-guards" armed with automatic rifles patrol the buffer zone around the national parks, an activity many local people regard as a gross violation of their traditional rights. In some cases, elephant poachers have been hired as eco-guards in an attempt to stop them poaching. It has been reported in the past that these guards often intimidated local people, and allowed their former poaching colleagues to pass freely through checkpoints but confiscated local people’s small amounts of game. The system has created distrust and antagonism between some conservation workers and local people and, in certain places, has strengthened the position of some of the best-connected poachers who are commissioned to hunt trophy animals.


Bantu fishing village on the Sangha River

The commercial bushmeat trade is destroying the fauna of the region.

As in the other countries of the Congo Basin, poachers gain access to remote areas by using logging roads. Some areas have now been trapped out, making subsistence hunting much more difficult. Many Pygmy and Bantu communities who live in these areas are very distressed, especially because they are fearful of resisting the well-connected commercial meat traders.55

Pygmies are particularly negatively affected by logging operations.

Logging operations often disrupt the lives of local people, but especially Pygmies, who rely on the forest for game, other food and raw materials. Unless constrained, the demand for bush meat to supply workers’ communities is so intense that it swiftly leads to the severe impoverishment of forest opened up by logging roads. This has dire consequences for Pygmy groups who use these areas of forest for their subsistence activities. The majority of logging company employees are Bantu because some logging companies believe that Pygmies are unreliable, although in the forest Pygmies are often used to locate the best trees. Pygmies resent this perceived favouritism and find it difficult to obtain reasonably remunerated employment in logging towns. In rural areas, schools and hospitals are always built in Bantu villages where there is strong discrimination against Pygmies, making access to these social provisions difficult for most Pygmies. Unless concerted efforts are made to involve Pygmy people in the management of their forests and for them to share in the profits gained, future generations are likely to feel cheated of their heritage. They will find themselves with forests devoid of game or commercially valuable trees surrounding inaccessible parks and other people’s farms.56

Companies logging the forests of Congo

Although a number of forestry enterprises in Congo (Brazzaville) have been parastatals, foreign capital (particularly European capital) has always played an important role in the sector. Under the macro-economic reform policies prescribed by multilateral lenders, privatisation of the former parastatals is currently taking place and is increasing the penetration by transnational corporations in the forestry sector.

In line with government plans to increase production, twelve new logging licences have been granted recently.57 In February 2000, logging contracts were signed with Lebanese and Malaysian companies. The Lebanese company was granted a 15-year renewable contract for 199,000 hectares in the north-eastern region of Likouala, while the Congolese-Malaysian company, Afri-Woods, was granted 104,000 hectares in the south-west of Congo.58

The German company Danzer (see page 55) and the French company Rougier (see page 60) have recently been awarded concessions in the north of the country. Other European companies operating in the country are the German company Feldmeyer (see page 57); a consortium of companies operating BOPLAC (see Bruynzeel, page 55 and DLH Nordisk, page 56); the German company Wonnemann (see page 66).

The map on page 37 is based on 1994 Ministry data, updated as far as possible with new information on concession holders, see Appendix. Not all new concession holders, however, have been identified.